In the second volume of The War with Mexico, Justin H Smith opens with a discussion of Mexican politics. The country had been ill-managed since its founding and had succeeded in chasing its entrepreneurial, wealth-generating class back to Spain. The country had been stripped of most wealth, with the exception of the Catholic Church. Unable to secure loans thanks to its long history of financial mismanagement, the government looked to plunder the church.
Meanwhile, Winfield Scott landed his army virtually unopposed on the beaches south of Veracruz. Over the next 7 months, Scott's relatively small army trekked across Mexico in a path not unlike Hernan Cortes. Veracruz was pounded into submission with artillery by early March. Santa Anna was once again sent retreating to Mexico City after the Battle of Cerro Gordo in April. Though some of his generals argued for an immediate assault into the capitol, Scott wanted more troops, supplies, and money. The campaign stalled until August when he resumed his march to Mexico City and captured it.
The differing viewpoints of the Americans and the Mexicans is one of the more interesting parts of the book. Where the Americans would willingly halt after a victory to discuss peace, the Mexicans - especially Santa Anna - viewed this as just an opportunity to rebuild his shattered army and somehow appropriate more money to take another crack at defeating the Americans. Nicholas Trist, the plenipotentiary minister for the United States, had many conferences during the lulls in fighting and nothing ever emerged. It was not until the Americans captured and occupied Mexico City and Santa Anna was forced to flee the country that real peace talks could take place.
Where the first chapter discussed politics in Mexico City, the final chapters look at the politics of Washington, from financing the war to lobbying for or against it, to international relations regarding it. The overwhelming victory by American forces was in spite of, rather than thanks to, the machinations of DC. Polk had wanted an inexpensive war but the costs grew rapidly and the Congress was not eager to provide funding, thus explaining Scott's halting advance. Arguments about how much of Mexico to annex ran the gamut from virtually nothing to all of Mexico. Polk himself was leaning toward a much larger chunk than was ultimately secured if only to justify the expense. However, Trist's unauthorized treaty - though not to Polk's liking - was an opportunity to end the war as soon as possible. As for international relations, Mexico had not won itself the allies it had expected because it had so often reneged on loans and harassed foreign merchants. The US earned grudging respect for winning what many - even Lord Wellington! - thought was an unwinnable campaign.
Of particular note, Smith paints a picture that is mostly approving of the US arguments for the war. The US invasion of the 1840s for unpaid debts was not unique. France invaded during the Pastry War of 1838 and again during the Franco-Mexican War (1861-1867), which initially saw Great Britain and Spain as French allies. Smith argues that Mexico brought most of its troubles upon itself.
The final chapters are dreary reading. Where the marches of Taylor and Scott offered a strong narrative that drew the reader along, the jump among various politicians and their disparate goals was often hard to follow and not very interesting. However, the footnoting is spectacular and so expansive as to make one wonder how one man could have gone through so much material for this work. Of course, he won the Pulitzer Prize for The War with Mexico.
Recommended.
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